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The Information Research Department, Unattributable Propaganda, and Northern 
Ireland: Promising Salvation but Ending in Failure?  
 
This article examines the role of the IRD (Information Research Department) in Northern 
Ireland during the first half of the 1970s. After discussing British conceptualisations of 
propaganda, it offers a detailed account of IRD activity, including how a Foreign Office 
department came to be involved on British soil; how IRD propaganda fitted into the 
broader apparatus in Northern Ireland; the activity in which the IRD was engaged – both 
in Northern Ireland and beyond; and some of the challenges faced which limited the 
campaign’s effectiveness. It argues that the IRD’s role was driven from the very top of 
government and came against a context of cuts, a deteriorating security situation in 
Northern Ireland, and a tradition of domestic propaganda in the UK. IRD activity 
pressed four key themes: exploiting divisions within the IRA; undermining the IRA’s 
credibility amongst the population; linking the IRA to international terrorism; and 
portraying the IRA as communist.    
 
The “Troubles” of Northern Ireland remain a contested era of contemporary British history. 
With much material still classified, rumours and controversy have proliferated. This has led to 
accusations of outlandish black propaganda schemes, alongside other covert operations 
including shoot-to-kill policies and state collusion with loyalist paramilitaries.  
                                                          
 The author would like to thank Huw Bennett and Andrew Mumford for reading earlier drafts of this 
article. He is also grateful to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions and 
feedback. 
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This article focuses on one aspect of these supposed “dirty tricks”: covert or 
unattributable propaganda. It specifically examines the early 1970s; a time, between escalation 
of violence in 1969 and the beginnings of normalisation in 1975, when such activity peaked. 
Although nationalists initially greeted the army as protectors in 1969, the security situation 
quickly deteriorated. Politicians in London attempted to work through Stormont to instigate 
reforms to address republican concerns whilst also reassuring the unionists, but policy 
implementation was often improvised and reactive. It lacked coordination and amounted to 
little more than ‘hopeful muddling through’. The British government’s desire, before Direct 
Rule in 1972, to minimise its responsibilities led to the outsourcing of certain security decisions 
and to the army feeling unsupported.1 This policy context inevitably created difficulties for a 
coherent and integrated propaganda campaign.  
Between 1969 and 1972, violence had morphed from agitation and protests to 
insurgency and terrorism. By 1971 propaganda became increasingly important – and, after 
adopting a rather coercive counter-terrorism strategy, Britain was losing the battle. Many in 
the military felt that Westminster had failed to understanding the power of propaganda; 
especially after internment resulted in more IRA recruits, national and international criticism 
of British policy, and increased Catholic hostility towards Stormont. Both the army and the 
                                                          
1 R. Thornton, ‘Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British 
Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972),’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 
xxx (2007), p.77, 103; W. Beattie Smith, The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis 1969-73: 
From Violence to Power Sharing, (Washington DC, USA, 2011), p.67, 121-2; P. Neumann, Britain’s 
Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-98, (Basingstoke, 2004), p.68. 
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Foreign Office, as we shall see, intensified Britain’s propaganda effort shortly afterwards.2 
From 1972, the British had better established the connection between military activity and 
political objectives, but, as London moved towards a policy of normalisation, involving police 
primacy and criminalisation, from around 1974, the more aggressive forms of unattributable 
propaganda began to decline.3 
This article explores three themes. First, it seeks to examine British conceptualisations 
of propaganda generally, and unattributable propaganda more specifically. It considers 
differences between military and civilian understandings and how the two interrelated in 
practice. This is crucial given that during so-called low intensity conflicts such as the Troubles 
military and civilian propaganda activity cannot easily be separated. There are two 
historiographical schools of thought regarding propaganda history, and the British landscape 
therein: one deriving from communications history and the other from intelligence history.4 
The former recognises the long-held importance of propaganda for the British government and 
has produced a series of case studies, often at the local or theatre level, from Malaya to Suez.5 
This approach has extended to examinations of Northern Ireland, where the propaganda realm 
                                                          
2 D. Miller, Don’t Mention the War: Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media, (London, 1994); 
p.78, 305; W. Beattie Smith, The British State and the Northern Ireland Crisis, p.342, 350-1; P. Foot, 
Who Framed Colin Wallace?, (London, 1989), p.18. 
3 For a discussion of the policy context here see Neumann, Britain’s Long War, pp.78-85. 
4 A. Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53: The Information Research 
Department, (Abingdon, 2003), p.7. 
5 For a detailed discussion of the historiographical development see Defty, Britain, America and Anti-
Communist Propaganda, pp.7-11. 
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was crucial.6 Propaganda is defined broadly around influence (both in word and deed) and there 
is little attempt to delineate overt from covert activity and military from political activity.7 
Scholars have recognised the difficulties faced by propagandists and broadly present a picture 
of slow learning and variable successes.8 This has overlapped with military or strategic history 
to an extent, whereby propaganda – often bound up in psychological warfare – is understood 
(again predominantly at the theatre level) as a key part of various campaigns, again with 
variable success.9  
By contrast, the intelligence school recognises the importance of covert propaganda 
both conceptually and in practice (and sees it as intertwined with broader secret activity). 
Although debate exists over the impact such propaganda can achieve, many believe it can be a 
                                                          
6 Miller, Don’t Mention the War; P. Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace, 
(Basingstoke, 2008). 
7 See for example, K. Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and 
Minds, 1948-1958, (London, 2002); G. Jowett and V. O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 
(London, 2015) and J. Auerbach and R. Castronovo eds., The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda 
Studies, (Oxford, 2013).  
8 G. Kennedy and C. Tuck eds., British Propaganda and Wars of Empire: Influencing Friend and 
Foe, 1900-2010, (Surrey, 2014); S. Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds: British Governments, the 
Media, and Colonial Counterinsurgency, 1944-1960, (London, 1995). 
9 On Malaya for example see R. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan 
Emergency 1948-1960, (Singapore, 1989); R. Clutterbuck, The Long War: The Emergency in Malaya, 
1948-1960, (London, 1967); J. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons 
from Malaya and Vietnam, (IL, USA, 2005). For a non-militaristic conceptualisation see J. Walker, 
Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia, 1962-1967, (Staplehurst, 2005). More generally, 
see D. French, The British Way in Counter-insurgency, 1945-1967, (Oxford, 2011); A. Mumford, The 
Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare, (Abingdon, 2012). 
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useful (but difficult to measure) adjunct to a broader strategy if given adequate time, broad-
based support, and if it is ‘designed in ways commensurate with its intended objectives.’10 
Neither school has particularly considered how Britain approached unattributable propaganda 
however, instead focusing on narratives of specific usage. This article seeks to demonstrate 
how Britain understood unattributable propaganda in the early 1970s paradoxically as 
something both distinct from yet overlapping with military activity. 
Second, this article interrogates, and offers the first detailed archival account of, 
Information Research Department (IRD) activity in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. The 
new evidence demonstrates that, as during other campaigns countering political violence 
further from home,11 Britain drew upon somewhat underhand and callous methods to subdue 
rebellion and subvert rebels. In doing so, this article places the IRD both within its broader 
Whitehall context and in relation to military activity in the theatre. Regarding the former, it 
                                                          
10 M. Turner, ‘An Appraisal of the Effects of Secret Propaganda’, in L. Johnson ed., Strategic 
Intelligence, Vol.3: Covert Action: Behind the Veils of Secret Foreign Policy, (CT, USA, 2007), 
p.116. The more theoretical or conceptual work generally comes from American scholars. For other 
examples see W. Daugherty, Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency, (KY, USA, 2006); 
R. Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: US Covert Action and Counterintelligence, (NJ, USA, 
2001). By contrast, John Prados has led a more critical school emphasising the pitfalls of 
undemocratic behaviour. See, J. Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA, (IL, USA, 
2006). 
11 Important works on this theme include, D. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War 
in Kenya and the End of Empire, (London, 2005); H. Bennett, ‘Minimum Force in British Counter-
Insurgency’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, xxi, (2010), pp.459-475; French, The British Way in 
Counter-insurgency; P. Dixon, ‘Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, xxxii, (2009), pp.353-381. 
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advances the argument that controversial British activity was not the preserve of so-called 
rogue elephants. Directives for covert propaganda came from the very top – from the prime 
minister himself.  
On the latter, it broadens existing understandings of British psychological operations in 
Northern Ireland by revealing the hidden hand of the IRD. There has been some excellent 
scholarship on the military’s information policy,12 but comparatively little on the civilian 
aspect.13  As such, it seeks to demonstrate the place of such activity in British strategy during 
the early Troubles, thereby contributing to the core literature on British security policy in 
                                                          
12 There has been some excellent scholarship on the military’s information policy role. See for 
example, H. Bennett, '"Smoke without fire"?  Allegations against the British Army in Northern 
Ireland 1972-75', Twentieth Century British History, xxiv (June 2013), p.275-304. For an earlier 
discussion see, Miller, Don’t Mention the War. Likewise, Dixon, Northern Ireland, examines military 
rather than civilian activity whilst L. Curtis, Ireland the Propaganda War: The British Media and the 
Battle for Hearts and Minds, (London, 1984) includes much material on Army information policy but 
no mention of the IRD.  
13 A key exception is an early account by Paul Lashmar and James Oliver. See P. Lashmar and J. Oliver, 
Britain’s Secret Propaganda War: Foreign Office and the Cold war, 1948-1977, (Stroud, 1998). This 
offers an impressive overview of IRD activity given that the authors lacked access to archival sources 
and relied on secondary material. Archival sources further our understanding in three ways. First, they 
demonstrate how the IRD fitted into the broader structure of Britain’s conflict in Northern Ireland, 
including its relationship with the army. In doing so, it offers new insight both into the broader strategy, 
in which propaganda played a key role, and the input of senior Whitehall figures in directing this 
activity. Second, archival material reveals the breadth of propaganda themes deployed by the IRD 
beyond the anti-communist angle emphasised by Lashmar and Oliver. Third, primary sources reveal 
why Ireland became a focus for the IRD and how budget cuts combined with a drive for flexibility and 
policy relevance shaped the use of propaganda.  
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Northern Ireland.14 Furthermore, this article advances existing understandings of the IRD 
beyond its role in the early Cold war.15 Comparatively little is known about its later activities 
and place within Whitehall. Consequently this article sheds new light on a department under 
pressure and unwittingly entering its twilight years.  
 
I 
 
In a government or security context, propaganda involves ‘the dissemination of information 
intended to manipulate perceptions in support of one’s cause or to damage an adversary’.16 
Broadly speaking, there are three types. The first, known as white propaganda, is conducted 
overtly with government sponsorship clearly acknowledged. It rarely draws on secret 
                                                          
14 See Neumann, Britain’s Long War;  Dixon, Northern Ireland; Beattie Smith, The British State and 
the Northern Ireland Crisis; C. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern 
Ireland, (Abingdon, 2014). Much of this work touches on propaganda only briefly, and from a more 
military focus. 
15 Since the opening of the IRD archives in the 1990s, scholars have been able to examine its role in 
the early Cold war in impressive detail. Such ground-breaking studies include K. Utting and W.S. 
Lucas, ‘A Very British Crusade: The Information Research Department and the Origins of the Cold 
war’, in R. Aldrich ed., British Intelligence, Strategy, and the Cold war, (Abingdon, 1992); Defty, 
Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945-53; J. Vaughan, Unconquerable Minds: The 
Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-1957, (London, 2005); 
R. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold war Secret Intelligence, (London, 2001). 
Lashmar and Oliver provide an important exception and have written about the demise of IRD as well 
as its early years. Lashmar and Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War. 
16 Turner, ‘An Appraisal of the Effects of Secret Propaganda’, p.108. 
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intelligence. Such propaganda was used throughout the Troubles to counter an IRA smear 
campaign and ‘ensure that a truthful account of military activities [was] presented to the 
media’.17 Given the pejorative connotations of “propaganda”, this was often referred to as 
public relations work.18 
The second and third types of propaganda are more covert. In both cases, government 
sponsorship is concealed – or at least is plausibly deniable. Grey propaganda involves 
spreading unattributable information. It is often gleaned from secret intelligence and is 
generally true, but may have been selectively edited. It usually involves governments 
encouraging journalists to insert favourable pieces into newspapers. To give an example from 
Northern Ireland: a British official supposedly discovered a story about IRA drug pushing both 
for financial gain and to increase sustained violence against the Security Forces ‘by young 
hooligans acting under the influence of drugs’. He fed it to the Sunday Telegraph on an 
unattributable basis, which then sent a reporter to Belfast to investigate.19  The third option is 
known more sinisterly as black propaganda. This tactic is difficult, controversial, and, 
unsurprisingly, used much less frequently than white or grey varieties. Black propaganda is 
‘the purposeful manipulation of the perceptions of a target audience through the use of 
disinformation or deception’.20 Whilst acknowledging the presence of the former, this article 
focuses on the latter two types. 
                                                          
17 Bennett, '"Smoke Without Fire", p.284. 
18 S. Cutlip, Public Relations History: From the 17th to the 20th Century, (NJ, USA, 1995), p.xi. 
19 B[loody] S[unday] I[nquiry], J. Welser (IRD) to B. Stewart (Cabinet Office), 7 Jul. 1971. N.B. the 
documents of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry are available online at 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-
inquiry.org/evidence-index/> 
20 Turner, ‘An Appraisal of the Effects of Secret Propaganda’, p.112. 
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Given the volume of literature on British counterinsurgency, propaganda – including in 
Northern Ireland – is often understood within the militaristic framework of psychological 
operations (PSYOPS).21 Originally known as psychological warfare, British terminology 
changed to PSYOPS in the late 1950s, partly to keep pace with American language (where 
there was concern about using the term “warfare” to describe operations aimed at friendly and 
neutral peoples) and partly to soften a term which was increasingly used in non-traditional 
warfare contexts, such as Malaya, Cyprus and, eventually, Northern Ireland. At the outbreak 
of the Troubles, the army defined PSYOPS as ‘the planned use of propaganda or other means, 
in support of our military action or presence, designed to influence to our advantage the 
opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of enemy, neutral and friendly groups.’22 From the 
military perspective therefore, PSYOPS could never be an end in themselves. They sought to 
make the military objective achievable. That said however, doctrine prescribed PSYOPS ‘a 
principle role when overt armed action may be restricted through political or other reasons’ – 
as was the case in Northern Ireland.23  
PSYOPS could be used in both traditional warfare and internal security contexts. In the 
latter, PSYOPS sought to offer a positive and constructive counterbalance to agitators’ 
propaganda. If, however, the security situation deteriorated ‘there is a need for a much more 
offensive type of programme, which whilst supporting the government aims, will act as a 
destructive force against the terrorists.’24 By the outbreak of the Troubles, army doctrine stated 
                                                          
21 See, French, The British Way, pp.196-7. 
22 T[he] N[ational A[rchives], WO279/649, M[inistry] o[f] D[efence], ‘Land Operations Volume III 
Counter-Revolutionary Operations Part I Principles and General Aspects’, 29 Aug. 1969. 
23 War Office, ‘Staff Officers Guide to Psychological Operations,’ 1962, 
<http://www.psywar.org/pdf_WO_PSYOPS_Guide.pdf>. 
24 Ibid. 
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that PSYOPS aimed to lower ‘the morale of the insurgents … thereby encouraging surrender 
and defection’ through tasks including ‘stirring up dissensions between the leaders and the rank 
and file e.g. by exploiting any weakness and eccentricities of the leaders and playing up any 
perpetration of harsh or unfair treatment.’ Much of this was conceived of in broadly overt or 
public relations terms, but a strong thread of unattributable propaganda existed along these 
lines too.25  
Political propaganda overlaps with PSYOPS. However, civilian practitioners did not 
use the term – it was seen as militaristic.26 Neither did civilians perceive what they did as an 
‘equivalent’ of PSYOPS. For them, PSYOPS was ‘a military activity and historically it is 
directed at [an] enemy and they are not aiming to tell the truth about that enemy, they are 
designed to confuse the enemy, [and] to deceive the enemy.’27 By their own admission 
however, civilian activity was ‘remarkably similar’; IRD staff referred to it as propaganda – or 
more often, as counter-propaganda.28 Associated more with underground resistance to 
totalitarian regimes, references to counter-propaganda formed part of a broader British tradition 
to emphasise the defensive nature of potentially unsavoury activity. Counter-propaganda, 
however, takes on many of the same forms as propaganda and can be just as active.29  For the 
British, the distinction was pure semantics. Both phrases have since fallen out of use, with 
Britain currently opting for ‘information operations’ or ‘strategic communication’. In the 
1970s, Whitehall’s propagandists seemingly differentiated between unattributable and covert 
                                                          
25 TNA, WO279/649, MoD, ‘Land Operations Volume III’, p.108. 
26 BSI, T. Barker (Head of IRD), ‘Written Testimony to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry’, 26 Sept. 2002. 
27 BSI, H. Mooney’s testimony to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 26 Sept. 2002), pp.74-5. 
28 Ibid., p.78. 
29 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p.306. 
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propaganda; using the former to describe grey and the latter black. They drew upon both forms, 
albeit grey much more so.  
The United Kingdom has a long tradition in political propaganda. Again, much of this 
is overt, revolving around various Foreign Office information departments or the Central Office 
of Information. However, white activity has long been complemented by unattributable 
material. During the Second World War, the Political Warfare Executive took the lead in 
undermining enemy morale. From 1948, the Information Research Department engaged in 
unattributable anti-communist propaganda and ‘grew adept at exploiting secret information for 
publicity purposes.’30 Meanwhile, The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or more commonly 
known as MI6) conducted the majority of the more sensitive black propaganda.  
As an irregular conflict, the Troubles blurred the lines between civil and military affairs; 
between traditional military PSYOPS, counter-propaganda, public information, and public 
relations (seen as more open and attributable activity to promote the British cause, although 
technically still propaganda).31 Although this article focuses on the IRD, it is impossible to 
separate fully the civilian and military activity. Indeed, the IRD maintained reasonably close 
relations with the military, especially in the realms of counterinsurgency and counter-
revolutionary warfare. Its staff may have seen PSYOPS as militaristic, but in the early 1970s 
the IRD was charged with continuing ‘to form the nucleus of a psychological warfare 
organisation in the event of an emergency.’32 On low-intensity warfare, the IRD ‘cooperate[d] 
with the Ministry of Defence in matters concerning psychological warfare’. They did so by 
                                                          
30 TNA FCO 79/182, IRD, ‘Information Research Department’, Appendix A, ‘Evolution of IRD’, 
1970.  
31 Cutlip, Public Relations History, p.xi. 
32 TNA FCO79/182, ‘Information Research Department’, 29 Jul. 1970, attached to N. Reddaway to J. 
Johnston, ‘Information Inspection: Future of Information Research Department,’ 29 Jul. 1970.  
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liaising closely with army information officers and providing material for the military to use 
unattributably.33 As we shall see, this was certainly the case in Northern Ireland in the early 
1970s. 
 
II 
 
Before examining the IRD activity, it is first necessary to consider how a Foreign Office 
department, experienced in overseas Cold war fighting, became deployed in Northern Ireland. 
The IRD was created in early 1948 to counter Soviet propaganda.34 Established under the 
Secret Vote, it expanded quickly and confidentially served a range of ‘clients’ from friendly 
governments to trade union leaders, and from Radio Free Europe to ‘CENTO’s counter-
subversionists.’35 
Throughout much of its existence, and especially during its first two decades, the IRD 
focused on international communism.36 After the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 however, it gained 
a mandate to counter Arab nationalism too.37 Propaganda diversification then extended to 
countering President Sukarno’s Indonesian regime in the 1960s. By 1968, the IRD was charged 
with: ‘the preparation and distribution to targetted [sic] recipients of non-attributable 
propaganda mainly of an anti-Communist nature.’ In doing so it drew on ‘raw material’ of a 
                                                          
33 TNA FCO79/240, FCO Planning Committee, ‘Information Research Department: Restructuring’, 
29 Mar.1971. 
34 TNA FCO 79/182, ‘Information Research Department’, Appendix A, ‘Evolution of IRD’, 1970.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda. 
37 TNA FCO 79/182, ‘Information Research Department’, Appendix A, ‘Evolution of IRD’, 1970; 
See also Vaughan, Unconquerable Minds. 
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‘classified nature.’ Divided into seven geographical sections and an editorial section, it 
employed 226 people in 1970 (up from 126 in 1952, but down from a high point of over 360 
in the mid-1960s).38  
In pursuing its aims, the IRD was not beyond targeting domestic British audiences and 
had been doing so since the early 1950s.39 As Thomas Maguire points out, ‘while the IRD was 
established in January 1948 with an ostensibly foreign remit, by 1949 its operations were 
already blurring the distinction between foreign and domestic spheres.’40 In 1951 the IRD 
created a small “Home Desk” or “English Section”, which primarily focused on industry and 
subversion. It remained in place throughout the Troubles.41 Meanwhile, as part of the cultural 
Cold war, the IRD buttressed supposedly independent domestic authors and presses through 
fronts including the BBC, several mass-circulation daily newspapers and the British non-
communist left.42 Domestic covert propaganda extended beyond the Cold war. By 1970, when 
Prime Minister Edward Heath needed a Whitehall unit capable of supporting the drive for 
                                                          
38 Ibid.; TNA FCO 79/182, IRD, ‘Information Research Department’, 1970. 
39 This was not wholly unusual. Unattributable propaganda had been used domestically on numerous 
occasions before the IRD was created, including during both World Wars and the 1926 General Strike. 
For more information, see R. Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography, (Basingstoke, 2002), p.409. 
40 T. Maguire, ‘Counter-Subversion in Early Cold war Britain: The Official Committee on 
Communism (Home), the Information Research Department, and ‘State Private Networks’, 
Intelligence and National Security, xxx (2015), p.642. 
41 Ibid., pp.656-65. 
42 H. Wilford The CIA, The British Left, and the Cold war: Calling the Tune?, (Abingdon, 2003), 
p.48; J. Smith, ‘The British Information Research Department and Cold war Propaganda Publishing’, 
in G. Barnhisel and C. Turner eds, Pressing the Fight: Print Propaganda and the Cold war, (MA, 
USA,), p.123. 
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European Economic Community membership, he turned to the IRD to plant material in the 
press and draft letters for MPs to send to newspapers.43 As Thomas Barker, the head of the 
IRD, explained in the context of Northern Ireland, the IRD ‘have had for many years a 
responsibility both in the home and overseas fields’.44  
By the early 1970s, however, the IRD was under threat. Barker recalled a changing 
context in the targeting and funding of British propaganda: ‘the threat from Communist 
propaganda was perceived, both officially and by the public, as decreasing.’45 The cold war 
had entered a period of détente and, whilst the government feared industrial unrest and labour 
militancy, the IRD’s cold warriors appeared rather antiquated as monolithic and orthodox 
international communism, of the Marxist/Stalinist variety, faced competition from a more 
diverse New Left about which Britain’s intelligence and security services knew little.46 
This sanguine view – about orthodox communism at least – may not have been 
universally shared outside the broader Foreign Office (and indeed faced stiff opposition from 
those who had spent their lives fighting communism), but it was enough to leave the IRD facing 
declining government interest in propaganda work. Confronted with inspections and criticisms, 
the IRD felt insecure. And justifiably so: in reforms known as ‘Mark II IRD’, Denis Greenhill, 
                                                          
43 P. Gliddon, ‘The British Foreign Office and Domestic Propaganda on the European Community, 
1960–72,’ Contemporary British History, xxiii, (2009), p.159, 164-5. 
44 BSI, C. Henn to M. Tugwell, 10 Nov. 1971. Emphasis added. 
45 BSI, Barker, ‘Written Testimony to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry’. 
46 R. Aldrich and R. Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence, and British Prime Ministers, 
(London, 2016), p.286; Lashmar and Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, pp.168-9. 
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then Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, cut its budget and staff ‘by more than 
half’: the budget from £1.5m to £650,000; staff from 225 to around 80.47 
Attempting to fend off further budget cuts, the IRD’s ‘responsibilities were widened to 
include monitoring and countering hostile propaganda from other sources, not only 
Communist, in particular terrorist organisations world-wide which were hostile to British 
interests.’48 These also included ‘revolutionary violence, industrial unrest, extremist and 
dangerously nationalist movements of all sorts.’49 It therefore became a leaner institution,50 
producing ad hoc publications when ‘the normal FCO machine is not flexible enough.’51 It was 
becoming ‘an organisation whose techniques can be used in conjunction with those of other 
Departments, for any purpose where the British Government’s interests are involved.’52 
Within this context, Northern Ireland became a target and the IRD gladly accepted a 
role. As one official put it, ‘those members of IRD who escaped the axe … will be all the more 
anxious to safeguard their future prospects.’53 Indeed, the Troubles coincided with a drive by 
propaganda specialists (their jobs under threat) to reinvigorate the purpose of the IRD. Not only 
                                                          
47 BSI, H. Mooney, Supplementary Statement to Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 11 Sept. 2002, para. 15; 
TNA FCO 79/240, J.O. Wright to N. Morrison (Civil Service Department), 1 Jan. 1971; TNA FCO 
95/1007, D. Greenhill to Heads of Mission, ‘IRD Mark II,’ 28 Jul. 1971. 
48 BSI, Barker, ‘Written Testimony’. 
49 TNA FCO 95/1007, D. Greenhill to Heads of Mission, ‘IRD Mark II,’ 28 Jul. 1971. 
50 TNA FCO 79/183, ‘Review by the Home Inspector of the Work of the Research Department, May 
– July 1969’.  
51 TNA, FCO 79/182, ‘The Future of IRD’, Paper prepared for meeting of DUS Committee, 9 Oct. 
1970.  
52 TNA FCO 79/240, Crook to Reddaway, 26 Jul. 1971.  
53 TNA, FCO 79/241, Aspin, ‘Transfer of IRD to Open Vote’, 4 Oct. 1971. 
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did the IRD have practice in unattributable propaganda, the organisation now actively sought 
new contexts in which to apply its experience.  
Despite a long tradition of using propaganda domestically, IRD staff still knew 
involvement in Northern Ireland would be controversial. Therefore, they rationalised their role 
by emphasising the international and subversive dimension to the conflict which, they argued, 
placed it into their remit. On the former they pointed to the Irish connection as well as to the 
Vatican, with one diplomat arguing that ‘the Holy See (and hence the Catholic Church as an 
institution) is a legitimate subject for the FCO’.54 On the latter, an IRD official justified covert 
propaganda by stressing that ‘The IRA ... being a subversive organisation with support from 
across the border is accepted as a legitimate target for propaganda’.55  
Nonetheless, self-rationalisation could only go so far. Some in Whitehall worried about 
‘the usefulness of this kind of action,’56 whilst others noted that tackling controversial non-
communist subjects, such as nationalism and terrorism, was a complicated business and ‘even 
when we correctly identify a movement hostile to our interests it does more harm than good to 
institutionalise our opposition to it.’57 Moreover, if the new and more flexible IRD was to move 
beyond communism, it would have to widen its contacts. This increased the risk of leaks, 
exposure and embarrassment.  
Accordingly, appointments had to take place under ‘deep cover’ and the personnel 
department was asked to put a note on the file of IRD staff serving in Northern Ireland stating 
                                                          
54 TNA FCO26/1570, Turner to Metcalfe, ‘Northern Ireland: Information Policy Coordination 
Committee’, 18 Dec. 1974.  
55 Quoted in BSI Mooney, ‘Supplementary Statement’, para. 18.  
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that anything done there should not be held against them: a quite striking admission of risk.58 
Senior diplomats even pressed for much of the IRD to be funded by the open, rather than secret, 
vote. This was an attempt to reduce ministerial embarrassment if their disavowed and secretly 
funded work became public; all the more so given that, as they acknowledged, the IRD was 
dealing with increasingly controversial and domestic subjects.59 The Ramparts affair (when the 
eponymous journal exposed CIA funding of various international student groups in 1967) did 
not affect the IRD directly, but it made officials afraid of Britain’s own ‘mini-Ramparts’ 
scandal. The revelation that Britain was secretly influencing opinion at home and abroad would 
be explosive – and Chapman Pincher, an investigative journalist specialising in intelligence 
stories had already come close to revealing it.60  Some in the IRD saw Northern Ireland as ‘a 
poisoned chalice’. According to Hugh Mooney, the IRD man sent there, it ‘promised salvation 
[for a department facing budgets cuts] but would probably end in disaster.’61  
A core question surrounding all types of controversial British activity in Northern 
Ireland is the extent to which Whitehall policymakers knew about it. This has important and 
widespread implications regarding whether it came as a result of over-exuberant local staff or 
amounted to strategy sanctioned by the British government. Regarding unattributable 
propaganda in particular, recently declassified archival sources reveal that the prime minister 
himself, Edward Heath, was a driving force. The work of the IRD must be seen within this 
context. Heath argued that ‘we were in Northern Ireland fighting not only a military war, but a 
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propaganda war’.62 He knew full well that the IRD operated in Northern Ireland and that senior 
officials such as Dick White (then Intelligence Co-ordinator) and Norman Reddaway, 
overseeing all cultural and information work at the Foreign Office, were working  ‘overtly and 
covertly, to blacken the IRA’ by placing anti-IRA propaganda into the British press.63 
This was seemingly not enough. By August 1972, with violence increasing and Britain 
suffering from the fallout of internment, enhanced interrogation procedures, and Bloody 
Sunday, the prime minister wanted ‘immediately to launch a massive counter propaganda 
attack in Northern Ireland’. This, Heath instructed, ‘should not be limited to the refutation of 
IRA allegations, but should also seek thoroughly to discredit both wings of the IRA.’64 Robert 
Armstrong, Heath’s personal private secretary, insisted that ‘the Prime Minister would like to 
see the place flooded with [additional staff], taken from Whitehall, the Central Office of 
Information or wherever available, and above all we should get hold of those who are 
experienced in psychological warfare.’65 This, as we will see, proved to be problematic as those 
working on Ireland lacked local knowledge and experience. Armstrong also instructed that the 
propaganda ‘counterattack … requires an immediate, sustained, and continuing effort every 
day.’ This would involve ‘using money freely’ to gain information, win friends and influence 
people; a line which could easily be interpreted as a license to bribe handed down from Number 
10.66  
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The highest sections of Whitehall – from Heath downwards – encouraged use of the 
IRD. In 1972, William Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, was ‘rather in 
favour’.67 The previous year, Stewart Crawford, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the FCO 
overseeing intelligence and security work, had argued in favour of applying ‘the IRD 
techniques of indirect, and where necessary covert, propaganda designed to counter hostile 
threats’ in Northern Ireland.68 In fact, Crawford stated that the posting of an IRD officer to 
Northern Ireland was done as a result of ministers expressing ‘their wish for urgent and 
effective action’.69 This unsurprisingly also involved the Home Office, where the home 
secretary sought to be kept in close touch with IRD operations.70 John Rayner, deputy head of 
the IRD’s Special Editorial Unit, noted that ‘the need for counter-propaganda over and above 
all the normal information … services is stressed by all concerned – Government ministers, 
senior civil servants, the military and the police’.71 Although it is highly unlikely that every 
individual piece of unattributable propaganda used was politically endorsed, available archival 
evidence does demonstrate a strategic drive and general endorsement coming from the very top 
of government.  
 
III 
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Having explored how the IRD secured its controversial role in Northern Ireland, let us now 
turn to the propaganda activity; its content and themes. Propaganda formed an integral part of 
Britain’s strategy during the Troubles, but it is important to remember that the vast majority of 
information work was overt, involving public relations and white propaganda. Covert 
propaganda formed a minority and complementary activity, used when attributable information 
would undermine its credibility. Tales of such propaganda in Northern Ireland have long been 
told. Stories range from allegations of IRA embezzlement to accusations of para-militants 
dabbling in witchcraft, with the British even going as far as planting black alters, animal blood, 
and upside-down crucifixes in parts of Belfast. Other allegations have ranged from Soviet 
rocket launchers being shipped into Ireland to the covert targeting of MPs seen as having 
unhelpful views on Northern Ireland.72  
Memoirs written by journalists covering the Troubles corroborate such activity. One, 
Kevin Myers, remembers how ‘in our various newsrooms we were being overwhelmed by a 
blizzard of facts and atrocities, lies and propaganda, from all sides, and it was simply 
impossible to tell truth from fantasy, fact from fiction.’73 Another, Simon Winchester, argued 
that the British (and the IRA for that matter) regarded journalists as ‘more gullible than brilliant, 
and often – too often – they were perfectly right.’ To give one specific example, he believed 
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that ‘the propaganda merchants and half a dozen lazy hacks’ prevented a proper investigation 
into Bloody Sunday.74 
Many of these existing accounts focus on military activity and it is certainly fair to say 
that the army took a lead role. By July 1970, it was actively considering establishing a PSYOPS 
unit in Northern Ireland.75 In October, a lieutenant-colonel was sent to army headquarters at 
Lisburn to run an Information Liaison Department. This did not achieve the required impact 
and, in September 1971, a new Information Policy Unit (IPU), headed by Colonel Maurice 
Tugwell, replaced it. Through holding unattributable briefings with journalists, the IPU sought 
to ‘fight the propaganda war.’76 Although those working in Lisburn deny any involvement in 
black operations,77 one former colonel has stated that ‘if one wanted to convey a message to a 
particular group, you can make it appear as if it was coming from somebody else.’78 At the 
same time, PSYOPS officers sent army personnel into the streets to distribute leaflets – 
disguised in Beatles wigs.79  
The existing literature is far quieter on civilian activity. How then did the IRD fit into 
this framework? Archival evidence and witness testimony demonstrate that the IRD was 
‘specifically tasked inter alia to place anti-IRA material in the British and foreign press and 
                                                          
74 S. Winchester, In Holy Terror: Reporting the Ulster Troubles, (London,1974), p.173, 210. These are 
slightly odd accusations, however, given that Winchester thanks two propagandists, Tony Yarnold and 
Colin Wallace, in the preface to his book for supplying ‘myriad of [sic] facts and figures and other 
information’, p.14. 
75 BSI, Colonel INQ 1873, ‘Oral Testimony to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry’, 2 Oct. 2002, p.8. 
76 BSI, Mooney, ‘Statement to Bloody Sunday Inquiry’, para.5. 
77 See Lord Saville et al, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, vol. IX, (London, 2010), ch. 178. 
78 BSI, Colonel INQ 1873, ‘Oral Testimony’, p.4. 
79 BSI, Mooney, ‘Supplementary Statement’, para. 66. 
22 
The IRD and Northern Ireland 
 
 
media.’80 Its job, from 1971, was to ‘blacken the IRA’.81 As Hugh Mooney, the IRD’s 
representative in Northern Ireland, reported back to London: ‘The darker side has not been 
neglected.’82  
Those engaged in traditional army public relations regarded Mooney as a mysterious 
figure.83 They worried that any association with his work would damage the credibility of the 
army’s overt public relations campaign.84 In reality, archives reveal that, Mooney, whose title 
was Information Adviser to the General Officer Commanding, worked closely with the IPU as 
well as with the UK Representative in Northern Ireland, feeding the military stories, using his 
press contacts, and designing various themes. Mooney was also authorised to work with the 
public relations branch, although they had serious reservations about his input (see appendix 
one). From evidence released through the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, we now know that in late 
1971, there was talk of a second IRD officer joining Mooney (this time working closely with 
Special Branch), but this does not seem to have happened.85 After Direct Rule in 1972, Mooney 
was transferred to the Northern Ireland Office but from January 1973 he became part of the 
staff of the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence in Belfast (a role created by Whitelaw to 
act as his personal security adviser and provide the main link between the senior army general 
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and the RUC Chief Constable).86 Mooney’s revised directive in 1973 continued to task him 
with applying ‘the techniques of non-attributable, where necessary covert, propaganda.’87 
Meanwhile in 1972, the UK created a new post in the Northern Ireland branch of the 
Directorate of Military Operations. It was responsible for coordinating ‘those aspects of 
military operations, intelligence, psychological operations and special political action which 
contribute towards HMG’s propaganda policy for Northern Ireland.’88 Similarly, Mooney, 
acknowledged being involved in ‘the consideration of all SPA [special political action] 
projects.’89 Indeed, IRD tasks in the early 1970s included to ‘maintain its capacity for special 
political action in the Information field.’90 The phrase ‘special political action’ is instructive. It 
was associated with SIS activity and involved influencing elections, deception, and black 
propaganda.91 This was traditionally conducted by the eponymous Special Political Action 
section of SIS, established in the aftermath of the 1953 Iranian coup. Here, then, is strong 
evidence that special political action, involving black propaganda was present in Northern 
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Ireland, implying SIS involvement, as well as further coordination between the military and 
IRD. When closing the department in 1977, Foreign Secretary David Owen admitted that the 
IRD had been engaged in ‘black propaganda’, which should have been the realm of SIS.92  
The IRD worked alongside other bodies, both locally and in Whitehall. Mooney sat on 
a Joint Information Policy Committee in the early 1970s alongside Tugwell and Colin Wallace 
(an army press officer). Its minutes regularly featured items headed ‘black propaganda’.93 In 
London, the IRD liaised with the Joint Action Committee (JAC) too. From the mid-1960s to 
the mid-1990s, the JAC discussed, scrutinised, and coordinated British covert action at senior 
official level. It brought together representatives from the Foreign Office, Cabinet Office 
central intelligence machinery, SIS, Defence Intelligence, and staff from the operational and 
policy sides of the Ministry of Defence. Theatres included the Yemen civil war, the Indonesian 
Confrontation, the Afghan-Soviet war, and now – we can add – the early years of the 
Troubles.94  
In summer 1971, IRD representatives were invited to participate in JAC discussions on 
Northern Ireland.95 Unfortunately, it is not clear exactly what the JAC’s role in Northern 
Ireland included. References have been wiped from the declassified archives and subsequent 
Freedom of Information requests have been unsuccessful. Nonetheless, JAC involvement 
signifies yet more civilian and senior Whitehall involvement in propaganda – and probably 
other forms of covert action too. Anecdotal evidence from those involved points to some ‘hairy’ 
schemes – although the JAC apparently took a backseat after the creation of the Northern 
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Ireland Office in 1972.96 Recent archival declassifications, therefore, allow historians to 
identify the propagandist, the structure of the propaganda organisation, and the context in 
which the propaganda occurred.  
They also reveal numerous IRD activities. One scheme involved using covert 
propaganda to counter IRA use of bazookas. The IRA had been struggling with these heavier 
weapons and found bazooka shells had not been exploding because the safety cap was still on. 
This explanation was deliberately concealed and instead the British issued a dummy army order 
stating that such shells should be tested electronically. This, Mooney hoped, ‘would have the 
effect of exploding the shell in the tester’s hands.’ Similarly, two young nationalists were killed 
while making a bomb during what happened to be the coldest night of the year. The British 
swiftly issued misinformation stating that gelignite reacts to changes in temperature. This was 
successful and the IRA quickly disposed of what they thought were suspect stocks of gelignite 
against soft targets.97  
Despite heavy archival classifications, it is possible to group IRD activity into themes 
emphasised and the purpose or ideology underpinning them. As with all propaganda, the IRD 
sought to provide ‘the audience with a comprehensive conceptual framework for dealing with 
social and political reality.’98 More specifically, they sought to ensure the legitimacy of British 
policy, discredit the IRA, and separate it from the broader republican community. 
Unattributable propaganda activity highlighted four core themes, and it is possible to give 
examples of each. 
First, the IRD sought to exploit divisions and foster rivalry amongst targets. For 
example, Mooney sought to set the Provisional IRA against the Official IRA by suggesting that 
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the latter were ‘seriously considering assassinating the dozen or so leading Provisionals in 
Belfast.’99 In addition, Mooney spread rumours that the Provisionals had betrayed the Officials 
in the aftermath of internment.100 It has also been alleged that Wallace leaked a fake story about 
IRA leaders embezzling funds to one journalist who swiftly became an assassination target 
himself once it was published – and Wallace had to ‘secrete the journalist in Butlin’s Bognor 
Regis holiday camp until the fuss died down.’101 It is difficult to differentiate army from IRD 
activity here, but Wallace and Mooney were certainly authorised to work closely together.  
Likewise, an account by IRA defector Maria Maguire published in 1973 has all the 
hallmarks of being processed through the IRD machinery.102 In line with this particular IRD 
propaganda theme, the book attacked Sean Mac Stiofain, chief of staff of the Provisional IRA, 
as intransigent, ruthlessly power hungry and thoughtlessly trigger-happy, thereby seeking to 
discredit him as a leader and expose splits amongst the IRA’s top brass.103 Publishing books 
was a modus operandi of the IRD and another, The British Army in Ulster by David Barzilay, 
a former Scotland Yard press officer and Belfast journalist, purported to offer a history of the 
IRA, but simply repeated ‘large sections’ of an IRD briefing paper ‘word for word.’104  
Such discrediting activity, it should be noted, was not limited to targeting the IRA and 
republicanism. There is evidence of British state propaganda involvement in a loyalist group 
known as the Ulster Citizen’s Army. A circular was distributed to the press in October 1972 
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proclaiming the creation of a new ‘more socialist-orientated and class-conscious’ force. Later 
press releases then used this position of an ‘incorruptible defence of the loyalist working class’ 
to attack unionist paramilitaries ‘for corruption and sectarian murder.’ If the army’s 
information policy teams did not create this movement to divide the loyalists, then they 
exploited this group which, in reality, had ‘no material existence’, by disseminating black 
propaganda on its behalf.105 Hugh Mooney was apparently especially ‘keen to drive a wedge 
into this split.’106 In early 1974, an Information Policy document from the previous year stated 
‘a decision was taken by IP to conduct a low-level campaign to highlight intimidation, extortion 
and assassination within the Loyalist extremist ranks using the UCA title as a cover.’107  
Second, IRD activity intended to undermine the IRA in the eyes of ordinary people and 
separate the violent terrorists from the broader population. Propaganda sought to portray the 
IRA as ruthless killers divorced from the concerns of the local community they were claiming 
to represent. For example, stories allegedly planted in the local press included supposed 
eyewitness accounts of IRA units raping girls at gunpoint.108 Likewise, the book written by 
IRA defector Maria Maguire mentioned above also tapped into this propaganda theme. It 
sought to drive a wedge between the IRA and the local community by raising doubts about 
Provisionals’ motives (which included criminality and personal ambition), highlighting their 
brutality and arrogance, and emphasising dissatisfaction amongst republican-sympathisers 
with IRA actions.109  
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A more famous example came in 1974. After discovering a batch of Provisionals’ 
documents on military strategy, British authorities sought to expose the IRA’s ‘total 
ruthlessness and disregard for the lives and property of either section of the community.’110 
Target audiences included both active terrorists and, through the use of mass (especially print) 
media, the broader community who may have been sympathetic to violence. The revelations 
ended up on the front pages of the Daily Telegraph, Sun, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, and 
Daily Mail under dramatic headlines including: ‘IRA “Burn Belfast” Plot’, ‘Provo Plot to Burn 
Belfast’, and ‘IRA Scorched Earth Plot’.111 In reality, the IRA’s plan was defensive, to be 
implemented only in the face of a large loyalist offensive, but the British propagandists ensured 
that this aspect did not reach the press.112 The story was an edited truth – a truth out of context 
– integral to the IRD tradition. Only the Irish Press expressed ‘suspicion’ that ‘intelligence like 
this, normally treated as top secret security information, is [being] used in a high powered 
propaganda campaign.’113  
Third, IRD activity portrayed the IRA as having links to international terrorism. The 
IRD strongly briefed on its connections to Libya in particular. One unattributable briefing paper 
stated that ‘by 1972 Libya was becoming the main centre in the Arab world for Irish contacts’; 
another that, ‘further Libyan involvement with the IRA was confirmed in March, 1973, when 
the Irish Navy arrested the Cypriot coaster, Claudia, as she was attempting to land a cargo of 
arms off the Irish coast’. Its owner, a convicted arms dealer, apparently claimed to have bought 
the weapons from Gaddafi – and the IRD helped to prove the link between Libya and the 
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IRA.114 This theme aimed to delegitimise the IRA by undermining their local goals and 
nationalist credentials. 
Fourth, IRD activity deliberately portrayed the IRA as subversive, Marxist, and part of 
a broader international communist movement – a move also designed to challenge the IRA’s 
nationalist identity and undermine local support. As early as 1969, the IRD worried that ‘there 
are now some signs that Communist and other left wing influences may be attempting to exploit 
both internal unrest and the implications to the Irish Republic of the conflicts in Northern 
Ireland.’115 When looking back on the Troubles it is easy to forget that the cold war remained 
a dominant point of reference for many in the Foreign Office and military; that the IRA was 
becoming increasingly communist in the 1960s under Cathal Goulding, its then chief of staff 
who sought ‘an armed Marxist revolution dressed up as an acceptable demand for basic civil 
rights;’116 and that, after the 1969 split, the Official IRA remained left-wing. Countering 
communism was also an area in which the IRD was comfortable, having spent much of its 
existence doing just that all around the globe. Accordingly there are numerous cases of the 
IRA/communist propaganda theme.  
For example, Mooney ensured that the Belfast Telegraph published a piece ‘giving the 
long-established communist links of certain key members of the IRA’ and steered its political 
editor ‘to make inquiries about the increased activity of the Northern Ireland Communist 
Party’. He also admitted that one local newspaper headline, ‘Red Menace is Real in Ulster 
Riots’, was the result of IRD material which had already been published abroad.117 Similarly, 
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the IRD cited other pro-republican groups, including the Irish Civil Rights Association and the 
Association for Legal Justice, as fronts ‘in the Communist tradition … that had fallen under 
IRA influence’.118 
At the same time, propaganda activity also tried to link the IRA to the more nebulous 
New Left. For example, one IRD briefing paper dated 1974 accused the IRA leadership of 
giving ‘free run’ to the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, described as being run by ‘a 
group of Socialists, Liberals, Trotskyists, Communists and Nationalists, to agitate for the rights 
of the Roman Catholic minority in Ulster.’ According to the IRD, it operated under ‘strong 
Trotskyist and “International Socialist” influence’, and officials accused the IRA of having 
‘moved in on a situation which had been made subversively promising by the New Left.’119 
Further demonstrating this theme, in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, a PSYOPS officer 
portrayed the situation as ‘leftist and supported by the more or less subversive and violent left-
wing groups.’120 
Interestingly, other IRD activity in Northern Ireland operated in parallel to covert 
propaganda. In January 1972, Elizabeth Waller visited Belfast. Waller was the Women’s 
Affairs Officer for the Foreign Office and was based in the IRD. Her remit, initially 
‘conceptualised as a sub-set of Britain’s wider anti-Communist propaganda activities’,121 was 
to broker cross-community cooperation amongst women’s movements, (the majority of which 
were predominantly middle-class and protestant,) and to increase the numbers of working-class 
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Catholic involvement. She believed that this could have a ‘decisive positive influence’ on the 
conflict and even managed to sponsor a women’s group visit to England in April 1972. In 
December 1975 she reported back to Thomas Barker, head of the IRD, about the various 
women’s organisations in Northern Ireland and which ‘positive’ ones the IRD might 
unattributably support. Ultimately, however, her efforts flailed as English women struggled to 
realise that ‘because of their nationality, they would never be accepted as neutral agents.’122 
The problem of neutrality and sponsorship aptly demonstrates why a concurrent covert 
propaganda campaign was so appealing.  
Normalisation in the mid-1970s led to a scaling down of covert propaganda. It could 
not support an active disinformation policy and the British realised that Ireland could not be 
treated as a mere extension of colonial counterinsurgency strategy.123 Responsibility was 
gradually handed over to the Royal Ulster Constabulary.124  Even before that, however, black 
propaganda, in particular, was on the decline as Lisburn became increasingly known as the 
Lisburn Lie Machine.125 In 1973 IRD staff were removed altogether,126 although they 
continued to take a close interest from London. Shortly afterwards, the IPU was closed down.127 
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In 1977, David Owen, as Foreign Secretary, closed down the IRD entirely in a move designed 
to ‘end the grey area, which for far too long escaped proper scrutiny, falling neither in the open 
area of our diplomacy nor in the closed area of spying.’128 
 
IV 
 
The IRD targeted audiences beyond Northern Ireland. Much of the above activity spilled over 
into the mainland British press too. We have already seen, for example, how IRD material on 
the IRA’s ruthlessness made its way into numerous British newspapers with seemingly little 
differentiation between local and national audiences. Indeed, discrediting the IRA and reducing 
sympathy for its motives spanned Northern Ireland and the British mainland with somewhat 
limited account for diverging security agendas.  
 One example came straight from London, rather than via Belfast. A rebuttal unit, based 
in Whitehall, sought to counter what officials deemed as pro-republican propaganda. Its staff 
perceived letters written in the British press by the American senator, Edward Kennedy, as 
being pro-IRA. In response, ‘counter material was put into the media via various IRD contacts, 
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including Lord Wavell Wakefield’.129 Other material, although adopting a similar theme, was 
perhaps more tailored to the mainland’s supposedly animal-loving audience. One false story, 
purportedly devised by propagandists in Northern Ireland, suggested that IRA internees had 
deliberately burned police dogs to death at Long Kesh.130  
 The anti-communist or leftist angle also spanned both Northern Ireland and the 
mainland. It was, however, slightly more pronounced in the national British press and certainly 
met a receptive audience. This reflected growing fears of industrial subversion, wreckers, and 
agitators with supposed links to the nebulous New Left in the early 1970s. That said, there was 
little nuanced appreciation for the variants of left-wing politics amongst officials who had 
fought communism all their careers and, according to Colin Wallace, they interpreted the New 
Left very broadly.131  
Accordingly, the IRD still played the communist card heavily in the mainland press. 
For example, in 1972, Wallace and Mooney disseminated propaganda to link the Soviet Union 
to Northern Ireland and portray the six-counties as Britain’s Cuba. They sold a story about 
‘Russian submarines landing KGB-trained subversives off the coast of Ireland’ to Trevor 
Hannah, an agency journalist in Northern Ireland. Having fact-checked with story with a senior 
Foreign Office official – who turned out to be none other than Hugh Mooney – the northern 
editor of the News of the World ran it as a front page story under a dramatic headline: ‘Russia 
in IRA Plot Sensation’.132 Despite the differing security contexts between Ulster and Northern 
Ireland, the anti-communism theme did span both. 
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 There have been allegations that unattributable propaganda coming out of Northern 
Ireland smeared the Labour Party. Focusing on traditional communism and radical industrial 
agitation, such propaganda targeted the broader British audience, rather than the narrow local 
one, in an attempt to influence the electorate. Wallace has alleged that, under the codename 
Clockwork Orange, intelligence officers in Northern Ireland smeared Labour politicians, 
including Harold Wilson, by leaking material to the press which exposed alleged ‘financial, 
sexual and political misbehaviour’ and portrayed the Labour Party as ‘very vulnerable to the 
allegation of Communist or Left-wing subversion,’ and, by extension, sympathetic to the IRA. 
Notes apparently made by Wallace for Clockwork Orange suggested that Wilson respected the 
IRA’s discipline and highlighted the fact that he had met with them back in 1972 when leader 
of the opposition.133 Much of this activity supposedly came from MI5 after the IRD had 
withdrawn from Northern Ireland, but one unattributable briefing paper written in 1973, 
portraying Wilson as soft on communism, apparently ‘included annotations on it in the 
handwriting of Hugh Mooney.’134  
Such smears have been vigorously denied by the British government and Wallace’s 
evidence has since been partly discredited after his being convicted for manslaughter (although 
this was later quashed). Nonetheless, Merlyn Rees, Wilson’s Northern Ireland secretary, later 
admitted that a ‘psych-ops’ operation did target other politicians ‘under the headings of sex, 
politics and finance.’135 Moreover, Anthony Cavendish, a former senior intelligence officer, 
has also recalled that ‘smears targeted anyone “of consequence” who appeared to be pro-
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Catholic or to want to radically change the existing North–South relationship.’136 If true, it was 
this line of propaganda which was perhaps most distinctively targeted the mainland and tied to 
the broader electorate’s fears of subversion and industrial unrest. 
Overall, however, there seems to have been little sophisticated effort to differentiate the 
province from the mainland, for reasons, which, as we shall see, proved problematic. Both saw 
much overlap in propaganda, especially in terms of discrediting the IRA and trying to reduce 
sympathy for their motives. The main difference was that local propaganda had more short-
term or operational intentions: to exploit divisions within the leadership; to target and turn 
active terrorists; and to destroy weapons and ammunition. In terms of discrediting the IRA 
more broadly, fears of left-wing subversion perhaps played more heavily on the mainland 
where strikes, such as that by the miners in 1972, were causing much disruption. By contrast, 
attempts to link para-militants to witchcraft and black magic likely gained greater traction in 
the more religious society of Northern Ireland. 
Beyond the UK, the IRD operated internationally and attempted to shape perceptions 
of the conflict overseas. The most obvious target was probably Ireland itself. In 1969, there 
was talk of re-examining British cooperation with the Irish government on IRD matters; not 
least because Britain ‘may well need to influence Irish opinion independently of the 
government.’137 There was also talk ‘about expansion of the IRD operation in Dublin.’138 It is 
unclear, however, whether this amounted to much. By 1973, the IRD reported that ‘it has never 
been considered appropriate to use the Dublin Embassy as an outlet for IRD material on any 
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great scale.’ In the same year, IRD activity in Dublin was scaled down to the ‘care and 
maintenance of our records’.139  
With security cooperation on IRA activity ‘strictly out of bounds,’140 the IRD was much 
more likely to cooperate with Dublin on countering international communism. As Tony Craig 
discovered, between 1970 and 1972 IRD material exposed the activities of three Russian 
“journalists” operating in Ireland. John Peck, the British ambassador in Dublin and himself a 
former head of IRD, approvingly reported that one of the Russians was being ‘widely referred 
to as the KGB man or “the Spy” and the fact that he appears to do none of the things expected 
of a correspondent has virtually destroyed his cover.’ The IRD supplied information relating 
to another of the three journalists which ended up being printed in the Irish Independent as: 
‘Soviet Mystery Man Slips into Dublin’. Thanks in part to the IRD, the Irish police paid close 
attention to the Russians thereafter.141 
 The next most obvious target was the United States: traditionally a source of much 
sympathy and funds for the nationalist cause. Accordingly, the IRD also sent material across 
the Atlantic. One might have suspected, given the cold war context, that the IRD would have 
emphasised the communist theme when writing for an American audience. Instead however, 
the British Information Services in New York felt that ‘most serious students of the Ulster 
situation among our press contacts are broadly aware of the history of the IRA’ (as drafted by 
the IRD with a heavy communist angle). Journalists had already published articles on its 
Marxist leanings. Instead, the IRD was asked for more ‘dirt’. New York asked Barker for ‘a 
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bit more digging’ which would ‘uncover other discreditable or disruptive material which could 
be produced.’ Likely dirt included material on ‘the IRA’s treatment of their own members or 
of informers, or about the internecine struggle between the Officials and the Provisionals.’ That 
sort of material was ‘more likely to put people off [in America] than more serious studies of 
the Marxist background.’ In fact, ‘Communist baiting is not as popular in the USA as once it 
was.’142  
The IRD also emphasised the theme of American funding of the IRA. Its customers in 
New York, however, sought more evidence, ‘if need be on a classified basis’, in order to have 
most impact in the American press.143 In response, Barker reassured them that the IRD’s 
Marxist-heavy ‘potted history’ of the IRA was not a substitute for stories designed to discredit 
the IRA, but admitted that ‘evidence of American subvention, although indisputable, is hard to 
find.’144 It has also been alleged that British propagandists handed a dossier on American 
businessmen sympathetic to the IRA to journalists. It accused one of an ‘alleged 40 adulteries 
during a three month period.’145  These themes were consistent with those used domestically: 
to discredit the IRA and reduce public sympathy. 
 The IRD unsurprisingly altered its message depending on the target country. In 1971, 
Barker was told that the United Kingdom received a ‘bad press’ abroad. This was particularly 
the case in Latin American countries with a strong Catholic tradition, where the Northern 
Ireland conflict was reported as ‘a religious war between Protestants and Catholics, with the 
monopoly of moderation and social conscience being shown by the Catholic minority.’146 It is 
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probably no coincidence that by the following year the IRD had developed a propaganda 
message for audiences in such countries: ‘many Catholics, including prominent personalities 
in the Catholic Church, condemn IRA violence and the IRA’s Marxist leanings.’147 In 
Venezuela, for example, British officials placed material in Catholic daily newspapers and 
proudly reported back that certain published articles were ‘based almost entirely’ on their 
work.148   
 Barker also became aware that ‘in Third World countries where this religious argument 
was not so applicable, the conflict tended to be presented in straight “colonial” terms.’149 This 
reveals the context of the time (awareness of which is essential for successful propaganda) and 
likely formed the basis of another IRD counter-theme to be tailored for a specific mass target 
audience.  
More generically, the IRD emphasised similar themes across Europe as at home. 
Indeed, some of the material used in Ireland was ‘in fact playbacks of material that IRD have 
already had printed Abroad’.150 One article, which was distributed from Bonn to Stockholm, 
started with the line: ‘IRA claims to represent the Roman Catholic community in Northern 
Ireland have finally been disproved with the publication of their plans to provoke Protestants 
and Roman Catholics into killing each other.’ This again highlights ruthlessness and a 
separation from the community they were supposed to represent – a standard line in UK 
counterinsurgency propaganda. Tellingly (and lacking subtlety), the article went on to suggest 
that documents discovered ‘seem certain to make expatriate Irishmen abroad think twice before 
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contributing funds to the IRA.’151 Although the IRD used broadly similar propaganda themes 
nationally and internationally, including some of the same material recycled in different 
countries, the overseas activity had a stronger emphasis on countering IRA funding from 
abroad. 
 
V 
 
Measuring the effectiveness of unattributable propaganda in Northern Ireland in the early 
1970s – or anywhere else – is highly difficult. Even the Foreign Office admitted a lack of 
evidence that the IRD worked, with one official concluding that ‘there is no accurate measure 
of the effectiveness of information work generally and measuring the effectiveness of IRD 
work in its present form would present even greater difficulty.’152 The army was less defeatist. 
It believed that propaganda could be measured through ‘an intelligence watch kept to observe 
the degree of target audience reaction.’ This included measuring the number of enemy 
surrenders in the immediate aftermath of a tactical PSYOPS campaign, examining captured 
enemy documents which discuss the impact of propaganda, and monitoring “observer 
commentaries”.153  
The Foreign Office perspective is perhaps more realistic. Accurately measuring 
success, especially of strategic propaganda, against the army’s criteria is problematic. Little 
reliable data exists on defections, not least because many IRA members who switched sides 
did so secretly or with new identities in order to escape retribution from their erstwhile 
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colleagues. Even with this data it would be difficult to prove how many had defected because 
of a particular propaganda operation rather than other factors.  
It is seemingly easier to monitor observer commentaries. Studies of media coverage in 
the early 1970s pointed to a strong media focus on IRA violence (conceptualised as 
‘terrorism’), and a presentation of the army as brave and ‘above the fray’. There was little 
attempt to historicise or contextualise events, thereby leaving audiences with a warped view of 
seemingly inexplicable and unjustified violence. This suggests a propaganda success. Again, 
however, it is difficult to isolate the impact propaganda specifically played in this. It formed 
just one variable alongside ‘media/state closure based on shared institutional commitments to 
the British establishment’ and an ‘internal "reference upwards" policy by which interviews and 
program[me] ideas were … subject to a hierarchy of corporate approval or veto.’154  
The best that can therefore be said is that propaganda might have had some broader and 
intangible impact in shaping perceptions. Indeed, the effects of propaganda, even in a 
totalitarian state, can only ever be partial.155 However, in a retrospective assessment of the 
entire campaign, the Ministry of Defence admitted that ‘Information Operations [as they are 
now called] were probably the most disappointing aspect.’156 Whilst such a broad verdict lies 
beyond the scope of this article’s narrower timeframe, it must also be taken as an indirect 
criticism of the IRD in the early 1970s, which was tasked inter alia to aid the military by 
providing material. Indeed, cuts to the IRD and its removal from Northern Ireland in 1973 
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could easily be read as a verdict of failure. Moreover, by 1978 some 43 per cent of Catholics 
in Northern Ireland still regarded the Provisionals as motivated by patriotism and idealism.157 
This is a damning verdict of a campaign which specifically tried to portray them as motivated 
by neither. 
Covert propaganda can only be effective if authorship stays covert. Unfortunately for 
the British campaign, nothing stayed secret for long in such a small and heavily scrutinised 
area as Northern Ireland. Accordingly, Lisburn soon became known as the Lisburn Lie 
Machine, as trust in the British media deteriorated. Rumours of propaganda swirled and 
inevitably negated the potential impact any such propaganda might have had. The 
republican/Catholic community, from which the British sought to separate the IRA, remained 
fundamentally sceptical of any material quoting unnamed military sources, and, when the 
extent of covert propaganda became known, it ‘undermined the effectiveness of the 
government’s propaganda effort and the army’s unit was wound up.’158 Authorities slowly 
realised that particularly black propaganda in Northern Ireland was proving counter-
productive.159  
To make matters worse, institutional rivalries hampered propaganda. The lack of 
coordination, especially on the intelligence front, in Northern Ireland is well known. It appears 
that this also extended to propaganda. The IRD worked closely with SIS and the army’s 
Information Policy team. But the latter also worked with MI5 and army intelligence. 
Propaganda came against a ‘background of institutional rivalry’ which severely damaged the 
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credibility of the army information service. As a result, some journalists felt that it was 
particularly unreliable and that the IRA was, in fact, more truthful than the army.160  
Tony Yarnold, of the army’s public relations team, never knew what Mooney did or to 
whom he reported. He does, however, remember that Mooney was given ‘a big house to live 
in and freedom to move at will throughout the barracks and Stormont.’ It was a recipe for 
friction. The same applied to Maurice Tugwell and Information Policy. Yarnold recalls some 
‘furious rows about who was responsible for what’ and that ‘the ordinary chain of command 
seemed again and again to be broken’. One of the biggest points of disagreement was about 
black propaganda and deceiving the media, with orthodox public relations teams growing 
frustrated at the likes of Mooney. Yarnold continued: ‘people seemed to be doing what they 
wanted to do in information – often very puerile things which in my opinion gravely set us 
back.’161  
To make matters worse, back in London the Ministry of Defence quarrelled with the 
Foreign Office about Mooney’s ‘title, designation, and everything else,’162 fearing that his role 
would damage the credibility of the army’s public relations activity. Accordingly, any IRD 
officer operating in Northern Ireland no longer officially worked for the Foreign Office. 
Instead, they were technically employed by the Home Office for the duration of their 
appointment.163 Cover titles, secondments, rivalries and euphemisms made for a decidedly 
complicated picture.  As for Mooney, even he later claimed to have been puzzled about the 
organisation, responsibilities, and bureaucracies of propaganda in Northern Ireland, leading to 
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accusations that he was ‘not doing a very good job of reporting back to the UK Rep about what 
was happening in PsyOps’.164  
There are three other areas which are open to general criticism: the tone; the balance 
between local and international factors; and the target.  On the tone, whilst overt public 
relations work might have attempted to portray British activity in a positive image, as we have 
seen, many of the IRD’s themes were negative. To be effective, propaganda should not rely on 
sowing hatred and fear, but should offer ‘more positive feelings such as pleasure, joy, 
belonging and pride.’165 Unfortunately, the British army and politicians executed so many 
counterproductive policies in Northern Ireland that its own propaganda never stood a chance. 
Time after time it gifted the IRA with propaganda coups, be it internment in 1971 (especially 
when pictures of Second World War huts and barbed wires surfaced), torture, wrongful arrests, 
or Bloody Sunday in 1972 (and other killings). These blunders forced propaganda to be reactive 
and excessively negative and gave the IRA the upper hand. The IRA believed that their 
propaganda campaign had been much more successful than their enemy’s – with over 60 per 
cent of the British public advocating withdrawal from the six Northern counties in late 1971.166 
As William Beattie Smith argues, the British approach ‘was less about deciding policy and 
more about excusing it.’167 Perhaps therefore it was the policy rather than the propaganda which 
must be criticised. In this sense, Northern Ireland was not unique. From counter-insurgency in 
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Kenya to Aden, British propaganda found itself reactive, defensive, and unable to deal with 
counter-productive policies and their public relations aftermaths.168  
British propaganda also struggled to find the right balance between local, national, and 
international factors. The system neglected local expertise when designing propaganda in 
Northern Ireland. The IRD was based in London. Mooney had previously served in Indonesia 
and Bermuda.169 John Rayner, another IRD official involved in Northern Ireland, had worked 
in Singapore, whilst Norman Reddaway had overseen propaganda in in the Middle East and 
Indonesia.170 This applied to Elizabeth Waller’s work too. In seeking to foster collaboration 
between women’s groups and governmental agencies, she was overly informed by the British 
model and underestimated the fragility of the local situation and the strength of discrimination 
and alienation.171 The same was true of military PSYOPS practitioners, with only Colin 
Wallace having much local knowledge. Effective propaganda relies on a nuanced approach 
relevant to local beliefs and cultures and which can use the predispositions of the audience to 
gain resonance.172 Again however, this formed part of a broader British problem. From 
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propaganda in Asia in the 1930s to Indonesia in the 1960s, over-centralisation and a lack of 
linguistic and cultural awareness continuously undermined the British effort.173  
By extension, overemphasis on international communism was also a weakness 
regarding Northern Ireland – as the IRD’s clients in New York pointed out. Similarly, Waller’s 
initiatives demonstrated an ideological approach which stressed communist infiltration. 
Indeed, like many of her IRD colleagues, she had spent much of her time cultivating groups 
designed to counter global communism and entered Ireland with this mind-set.174 As Helen 
McCarthy puts it, her dealings were ‘pursued within the ideological parameters of the Cold 
War.’175 The same can be said of the IRD. Indeed, Colin Wallace later testified that ‘There was 
a paranoia about a communist conspiracy.’ He argued that ‘inevitably the Intelligence Services 
saw the violence in Northern Ireland as yet another manifestation of the wider global pattern 
of subversion generally’ and accused the British of erroneously and simplistically applying the 
communist label on both factions of the IRA in order to achieve political goals.176 Such a lack 
of local nuance, reliance on experienced cold warriors, and an emphasis on international factors 
helps to explain why propaganda themes spilled over from Northern Ireland to the mainland 
and vice versa with little differentiation despite the differing security agendas. 
Assessing the situation within a pre-existing framework might have helped to legitimise 
the propaganda routines and experience upon which Whitehall sought to draw, but it 
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undermined local nuance and individual agency in terms of propaganda content. Moreover, 
propaganda failed to properly understand the New Left. SIS, the agency from which IRD 
received much of its information, had spent years trying to penetrate communist parties but, as 
one former SIS officer confessed, ‘now there was the radical “New Left” – about which we 
knew nothing!’177 Again this was not unique to the Irish experience; from 1945, British 
propaganda, and intelligence generally, consistently emphasised external ideological 
influences and external instigation of trouble as a means to legitimise counter-action and 
undermine local grievances.178 
Tendency to treat the broader population as a target formed a third weakness. Tugwell 
perceived a vast swathe of nationalist groups as IRA fronts, including ‘Republican Clubs’, the 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, Catholic Ex-Serviceman’s Association, ‘university 
groups and teachers,’ ‘various Belief and Action committees in Catholic areas’, the Association 
of Irish Priests, and ‘a number of RC [Roman Catholic] priests.’179 This had long characterised 
Britain’s approach during colonial counterinsurgency and, back in the 1950s, had been heavily 
criticised by the Colonial Office on the grounds that entire communities became stigmatised. 
Not only did this make winning hearts and minds difficult, but it was inappropriate to label 
whole populations as a ‘hostile target.’180 Traditionally, the propaganda of liberal democracies 
targets individuals ‘by challenging their competence and/or their sincerity’, whereas targeting 
whole groups is more associated with authoritarian regimes.181 Britain, as we have seen, 
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certainly engaged in the former – but it also came dangerously close to doing the latter. Too 
broad a target risked stigmatising whole communities, increasing anti-British attitudes further 
still, and driving the population towards the IRA. 
 
VI 
 
If the unattributable propaganda campaign in Ireland did lack tangible success in the early 
1970s, it formed a significant episode regardless. At one level IRD involvement offers an 
example of a democratic government subverting its own free press. Combined with recent 
revelations about the sheer extent of mass surveillance and undercover “kill squads” in the 
province,182 it adds weight to a growing impression of Northern Ireland as an oversize prison 
or a quasi-East Germany of authoritarian and non-consensual rule. Moreover, the campaign 
offers important insight into how Britain approached unattributable propaganda in the early 
1970s. Much has been written on the late 1940s and 1950s, but later understandings and 
vocabularies are far less understood. 
A great deal of British activity in Northern Ireland remains classified. Unattributable 
propaganda, however, is one area where it is possible to shine a light on certain covert activities 
– especially in the early 1970s. And it is important to do so. We can never understand or come 
to terms with the past if we do not know what happened and who authorised it. This is 
especially the case regarding such a controversial and sensitive conflict as the Troubles.  
New evidence demonstrates a clear civilian role, as well as the IRD’s interplay with 
both the local military and broader Whitehall apparatus. Moreover, declassified archives reveal 
that IRD involvement and a propaganda offensive were strategically directed from the very top 
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of government. This again is important. Awareness of who conducted and authorised such 
activity not only gives a better understanding of the British response but injects a measure of 
accountability for various actions. It also allows historians to analyse the structure and 
centralisation of the propaganda activity, thereby providing insight into some of the challenges 
faced, and allowing a more detailed analysis of propaganda than hitherto possible.  
This article has considered the purpose of the campaign, the propagandists and their 
structure, the themes addressed, and the target audience. Ongoing classifications, however, 
mean certain questions remain. There is not enough evidence to assess the specific (linguistic) 
techniques and channels used in a sufficiently detailed and rigorous manner. The same can be 
said for audience reaction and more specific analysis of target audience (i.e. between mass and 
cultural elite or opinion formers).183 On the latter however, the IRD does seem to have operated 
through print media and so targeted a mass (or at least community-wide) audience.  
IRD propaganda in Northern Ireland drew on colonial, cold war, and domestic 
experience. This experience, combined with the deteriorating security situation in Northern 
Ireland and the IRD’s need to reinvigorate itself within Whitehall gave the department a role 
in the Troubles. Nonetheless, its activity was always bound to be controversial, resulting in a 
degree of self-rationalisation and the use of cover titles. Once engaged in Northern Ireland, the 
IRD sought to divide and discredit the IRA, whilst also reducing sympathy for terrorist actions 
locally, nationally, and internationally. In doing so, the IRD struggled with a lack of nuance 
and appreciation of local factors, institutional rivalries, and a tension between an inherently 
liberal democratic focus on discrediting individuals and a tendency towards broad community-
wide targeting. The department closed down shortly afterwards. 
                                                          
183 For a discussion of analysing propaganda see Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 
p.290. 
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Appendix 1: PSYOPS and Military Information Organisations in January 1972184 
 
                                                          
184 Lord Saville et al, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, vol. IX, ch. 178.  
